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A finite two person zero-sum stochastic game is defined by a
state space Ω, actions spaces I and J, a transition probability Q
from Ω× I× J to ∆(Ω) and a real payoff function g on Ω× I× J.
Time is discrete: at stage n given the past history including ωn
the players choose (at random) in and jn, the stage payoff is
gn = g(ωn, in, jn) and the law of the new state ωn+1 is q(ωn, in, jn).
For a λ -discounted evaluation of the payoff (Shapley (1953)),
one obtains existence of the value vλ , unique solution of :
vλ (ω) = valX×Y [λg(ω, i, j)+(1−λ )∑
ω ′
q(ω, i, j)(ω ′)vλ (ω ′)]
where X = ∆(I),Y = ∆(J).
This recursive formula extends to :
1) general repeated games (incomplete information, signals ...)
2) general evaluation, defined by a probability {θn} n≥1 and
then g = ∑n θngn.
A finite two person zero-sum stochastic game is defined by a
state space Ω, actions spaces I and J, a transition probability Q
from Ω× I× J to ∆(Ω) and a real payoff function g on Ω× I× J.
Time is discrete: at stage n given the past history including ωn
the players choose (at random) in and jn, the stage payoff is
gn = g(ωn, in, jn) and the law of the new state ωn+1 is q(ωn, in, jn).
For a λ -discounted evaluation of the payoff (Shapley (1953)),
one obtains existence of the value vλ , unique solution of :
vλ (ω) = valX×Y [λg(ω, i, j)+(1−λ )∑
ω ′
q(ω, i, j)(ω ′)vλ (ω ′)]
where X = ∆(I),Y = ∆(J).
This recursive formula extends to :
1) general repeated games (incomplete information, signals ...)
2) general evaluation, defined by a probability {θn} n≥1 and
then g = ∑n θngn.
The asymptotic analysis is the study of the sequence of
values along a family of evaluations with mean going to ∞.
Example of proof: algebraic approach for finite discounted
stochastic games, Bewley-Kohlberg (1976).
Open problems:
i) stochastic games: finite state space and compact actions
space,
ii) general finite repeated game.
Recents counter examples cover:
Case i) Guillaume Vigeral (2013)
Case ii) Bruno Ziliotto (2013): finite action spaces and public
signals on the state space.
We show that by coupling two stopping time problems one can
construct two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finite
state space having oscillating discounted values.
This unifies and generalizes the above recent results.
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Configuration
A configuration P is defined by a general zero-sum repeated
game on a state space Ω = Ω
⋃{ω¯} starting from some state
ω ∈Ω, known to the players.
Each couple of strategies (σ ,τ) of the players specifies, with
the parameters of the game, the law of the stopping time S of
exit of Ω:
S = min{n ∈ IN;ωn /∈Ω}.
For each evaluation θ = {θn} on IN∗ = 1,2, ..., let gθ (σ ,τ) be the
expected (normalized) duration spent in Ω.
gθ (σ ,τ) = Eσ ,τ [
S−1
∑
n=1
θn].
Assume that Player 1 (resp 2) wants to minimize (resp
maximize) this quantity, and define the inertia rate:
Qθ = sup
τ
inf
σ
gθ (σ ,τ) = inf
σ
sup
τ
gθ (σ ,τ)
Then for each α < β , in the game with evaluation θ and payoff
α in Ω and β in the absorbing state ω¯, Player 1 (the maximizer)
minimizes gθ (σ ,τ) since the payoff is given by
γθ (σ ,τ) = αgθ (σ ,τ)+β (1−gθ (σ ,τ)).
In particular if the game has a value vθ then
vθ = αQθ +β (1−Qθ )
A first simple example is a dynamic programming problem P.
with three states Ω = {ω, ω¯,ω−} where both ω¯ and ω− are
absorbing.
The action set is X = [0,1] and the impact of an action x is on
the transitions, given by a(x) from ω to ω¯ and b(x) from ω to ω−,
where a and b are two continuous function from [0,1] to [0,1].
β ∗α
α∗
a(x)
b(x)
ω
ω−
ω¯
Here for any discount factor λ ,
Qλ = inf
x
λ +(1−λ )b(x)
λ +(1−λ )b(x)+(1−λ )a(x)
Another example consist of half part of a game defined by
Bewley and Kohlberg (1978).
This is a 3 states example with 2 absorbing states: ω¯ with
payoff β , ω− with payoff α, and β > α. In state ω the payoff is
α and the transitions are given by:
Stay Quit
Stay ω ω¯
Quit ω¯ ω−
Let x (resp. y) be the probability on Stay for player 1 (resp. 2).
The mixed extension is the configuration:
β ∗α
α∗
a(x,y)
b(x,y)
ω
ω−
ω¯
with a(x,y) = x(1− y)+ y(1− x), b(x,y) = xy.
Here for any discount factor λ ,
Qλ = inf
x
sup
y
λ +(1−λ )b(x,y)
λ +(1−λ )b(x,y)+(1−λ )a(x,y)
= inf
x
sup
y
λ +(1−λ )b(x,y)
λ +(1−λ )b(x,y)+(1−λ )a(x,y)
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Reversibility
Consider now a two person zero-sum stochastic game G
generated by two dual configurations P1 and P2 of the previous
type, with α1 =−1, α2 = 1, which are coupled:
the exit domain from P1 (Ω1 \Ω1) is the starting state ω2 in P2
and reciprocally.
For example
1−1
−1∗ 1∗
a2(x2)
a1(x1)
b1(x1) b2(x2)
ω1
ω−
ω2
ω+
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In addition we assume that the exit event is known by the
players and that the payoff are discounted.
For each λ ∈]0,1] this defines a game Gλ with value vλ
satisfying:
vλ (ω
1) = v1λ ∈ [−1,1[,vλ (ω2) = v2λ ∈]−1,1].
In particular, starting from state ω1 the model is equivalent to
the one with an absorbing exit state ω2 with payoff vλ (ω
2) (by
stationarity), which thus corresponds to the payoff β in the
configuration P of the previous section.
Proposition
v1λ = Q
1
λ × (−1)+(1−Q1λ )× v2λ
v2λ = Q
2
λ × (+1)+(1−Q2λ )× v1λ .
Corollary
v1λ =
Q2λ −Q1λ −Q1λ Q2λ
Q1
λ
+Q2
λ
−Q1
λ
Q2
λ
v2λ =
Q2λ −Q1λ +Q1λ Q2λ
Q1
λ
+Q2
λ
−Q1
λ
Q2
λ
Comments
1) As λ goes to 0, Qλ converges to 0 (and vλ converges to β ) in
the configuration of Section 1, as soon as limsup
a(x)
b(x) =+∞, as x
goes to 0.
2) In the current framework, assuming that both Qiλ go to 0, the
asymptotic behavior of v1λ depends upon the evolution of the
ratio
Q1λ
Q2
λ
. In fact one has:
v1λ ∼ v2λ ∼
1− Q1λ
Q2
λ
1+
Q1
λ
Q2
λ
.
Theorem
Assume that both Qiλ go to 0 and that
Q1λ
Q2
λ
has more than one
accumulation point, then viλ does not converge.
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.
Theorem
Assume that both Qiλ go to 0 and that
Q1λ
Q2
λ
has more than one
accumulation point, then viλ does not converge.
Comments
More precisely it is enough that Qiλ ∼ λ rci(λ ) for some r > 0,
whith 0 < A≤ ci ≤ B and that one of the ci does not converge to
obtain the result.
The next section will describe several configurations generating
such probabilities Qiλ , with c
i converging or not.
We will use the terminology regular or oscillating configurations.
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Example A0 : Regular with 0 player
Consider a random walk on N∪{−1} and exit state −1. In any
other state m ∈ N the transition is 1
2
δm−1 + 12 δm+1. The starting
state is 0. Denote by sn the probability that exit happens at
stage n ; it is well known that the generating function of S is
given by F(z) = 1−
√
1−z2
z
. Hence,
Qλ =
+∞
∑
n=1
sn
n
∑
t=1
λ (1−λ )i−1
=
+∞
∑
n=1
sn(1− (1−λ )n)
= F(1)−F(1−λ )
=
√
2λ −λ 2−λ
1−λ
∼
√
2λ .
Example A1 : Regular with one player
Take a(x) = x and b(x) = x2.
Then xλ minimizes gλ (x) with
gλ (x) =
(λ +(1−λ )b(x))
λ +(1−λ )(a(x)+b(x)) (1)
so that: x2λ =
λ
1−λ and
Qλ ∼ 2
√
λ . (2)
β ∗−1
−1∗
x
x2
ω
ω−
ω¯
Example A2: regular configuration with 2 players
BK- configuration:
Stay Quit
Stay ω ω¯
Quit ω¯ ω−
x (resp. y) is the probability on Stay and
a(x,y) = x(1− y) +y(1− x), b(x,y) = xy.
β ∗−1
−1∗
a(x,y)
b(x,y)
ω
ω−
ω¯
Proposition
Qλ ∼
√
λ .
One has
gλ (x,y) =
λ +(1−λ )b(x,y)
λ +(1−λ )b(x,y)+(1−λ )a(x,y)
.
Hence xλ = yλ ∼
√
λ .
Thus this configuration induces exit transitions a(xλ ,yλ ) of the
order of 2
√
λ and b(xλ ,yλ ) of the order of λ , so that Qλ ∼
√
λ .
This defines a regular configuration similar to example A1.
Example B1: Example A1 perturbed
To get oscillations one can choose:
a(x) = xf (x) with f (x) bounded away from 0, oscillating and such
that f ′(x) = o(1/x).
For example, f (x) = 2+ sin(ln(−lnx)) and b(x) = x2.
Proposition
For this choice of transition functions one has:
Qλ ∼
2
√
λ
f (
√
λ )
.
Example B2: example A2 perturbed
Let s ∈ C1(]0, 1
16
],R) such that s and x→ xs′(x) are both bounded
by 1
16
. Consider a configuration as before but for perturbed
functions a and b:
a(x,y) =
(
√
x+
√
y)(1−√x+ s(x))(1−√y+ s(y)
2(1− x)(1− y)(1− f2(x,y))
b(x,y) =
√
xy
[
(1−√x)(1−√y)+ f1(x,y)−√xyf2(x,y)
]
(1− x)(1− y)(1− f2(x,y)) .
where
f1(x,y) =
{√
xs(x)−√ys(y)√
x−√y if x 6= y
2xs′(x)+ s(x) if x = y
and
f2(x,y) =
{√
ys(x)−√xs(y)√
x−√y if x 6= y
2xs′(x)− s(x) if x = y
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Then by Vigeral (2013) these functions a and b are continuous,
and one can compute that the configuration is oscillating of
order 1
2
.
The next 4 configurations are an outcome of the work of Ziliotto
(2013) and use exactly the same tools.
Example B3: Countable action space
We consider again example A1 but now the action space X is
IN∗ and the transition are given by (an,bn) = ( 12n ,
1
4n
).
Proposition
For this configuration Qλ/
√
λ oscillates on a sequence {λm} of
discount factors like λm =
1
2m
.
Note first that the choice n inducing x = 1
2n
is asymptotically
optimal (recall a(x) = x,b(x) = x2), at λ2n =
1
4n
and thus
Qλ ∼ 2
√
λ .
For λ = λ2n+1 one obtains:
gλ (
1
2n
)∼ (1
2
× 1
4n
+
1
4n
)2n ∼ 3
√
2
2
√
λ
gλ (
1
2n+1
) ∼ (1
2
× 1
4n
+
1
4n+1
)2n+1 ∼ 3
√
2
2
√
λ
Finally one checks that
gλ (
1
2n+m
)≥ 3
√
2
2
√
λ
for m =−n, ...,−1 and m≥ 2.
Thus for this specific λ , gλ (x) is bounded below by a quantity of
the order 3
√
2
2
√
λ .
It follows that Qλ/
√
λ oscillates between 2 and 3
√
2
2
on a
sequence {λm} of discount factors like λm = 12m .
Exemple B4 :Countable state space
We consider here a configuration which is the dual of the
previous one with finite action space and countably many
states.
The state space countains a countable subspace of
probabilities y = (yA,yB) on two positions A and B with
yn = (
1
2n
,1− 1
2n
),n = 0,1, ..., and two absorbing states A∗ and B∗.
Hence Ω = {yn,n ∈ IN;A∗,B∗}, ω = y0 and Ω\Ω = {B∗}.
The player has two actions: Stay or Quit.
Consider state yn. Under Quit an absorbing state is reached: A
∗
with probability yAn and B
∗ with probability yBn .
Under Stay the state evolves from yn to yn+1 with probability 1/2
and to y0 = (1,0) with probability 1/2.
The player is informed upon the state.
A (stationary) strategy of the player can be identified with a
stopping time corresponding to the first state yn when he
chooses Quit.
Let Tn be the random time corresponding to the first occurrence
of yn (under Stay) and θn the associated strategy: Quit (for the
first time) at yn.
Proposition
gλ (θn) = 1−
(1−λ 2)(1− 1
2n
)
1+2n+1λ (1−λ )−n−λ
Proof.
Lemma 2.5 in Ziliotto (2013) gives
E[(1−λ )Tn ] = 1−λ
2
1+2n+1λ (1−λ )−n−λ
Hence Qλ = 1− (1−λ 2)maxn∈N 1−
1
2n
1+2n+1λ (1−λ )−n−λ and one shows,
using Ziliotto’s Lemma 2.8, that the configuration is irregular :
Qλ√
λ
oscillates between two positive values.
Example B5: A MDP with signals
The next configuration corresponds to a Markov decision
process with 2 states: A and B. The player has 2 actions: Stay
or Quit. The transition are as follows:
A 1
2
;ℓ 1
2
;r
Stay A ( 1
2
A+ 1
2
B)
Quit A∗ A∗
B 1
2
;ℓ 1
2
;r
Stay A B
Quit B∗ B∗
The transition is random: with probability 1/2 of type ℓ and
probability 1/2 of type r. The player is not informed upon the
state reached but only on the signal ℓ or r. The natural “auxiliary
state" space is then the beliefs of the player on (A,B) and the
model is equivalent to the previous one. In fact under Stay, ℓ
occurs with probability 1/2 and the new parameter is y0 = (1,0);
and after r, the belief evolves from yn to yn+1. Again this
configuration generates an oscillating Qλ of the order of
√
λ .
Example B6: A symmetric game with no signal on the
state
A next transformation is to introduce two players and to
generate the random variable 1
2
(ℓ)+ 1
2
(r) in the above model
through the moves of the players (joint controlled lottery).
This leads to the original framework of the game defined by
Ziliotto (2013): action and state spaces are finite and the only
information of the players is the sequence of moves and the
initial state ω = A.
Here Ω = {A,B,A∗,B∗} and Ω\Ω = {B∗}.
Player 1 has three moves: Stay1, Stay2 and Quit, and player 2
has 2 moves: Left and Right. The transition are as follows:
A Left Right
Stay1 A (1
2
A+ 1
2
B)
Stay2 (1
2
A+ 1
2
B) A
Quit A∗ A∗
B Left Right
Stay1 A B
Stay2 B A
Quit B∗ B∗
By playing (1/2,1/2,0) (resp. (1/2,1/2)) player 1 (resp. player
2) can mimick the previous distribution on (ℓ,r) where ℓ
corresponds to the event “the moves are on the main diagonal".
It follows that this behavior is consistent with optimal strategies
hence the induced distribution on plays is like in the previous
example B5.
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By combining some of these regular/oscillating configurations,
one recover several recent examples where vλ does not
converge:
◮ An example with finitely many states, compact action sets
and smooth transitions (Vigeral 2013)
◮ An example with finitely many states, countable action sets
and perfect information (Ziliotto 2013)
◮ Several examples of finite games with signals or in the
dark (Ziliotto 2013)
One also get new examples :
◮ An example with finitely many states, compact action sets,
smooth transitions and perfect information.
◮ An example with finitely many states, compact action set
for Player 1 and finite for Player 2, and smooth transitions.
◮ Smooth MDP with a countable number of states and 2
actions.
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Alternative evaluations
The stationarity of the evaluation (discounted game) was
crucial in the computations. However it is possible to construct
similar examples in which limvn does not exist.
The idea grounds on a lemma of Neyman (2003) giving
sufficient conditions for the two sequences vn and vλn , with
λn =
1
n
, to have the same asymptotic behavior as n tends to
infinity.
Irreversible case
The above analysis shows that oscillations in the exit probability
and reversibility allows for non convergence of the discounted
values.
In fact without reversibility one has convergence, for example in
absorbing games or games with incomplete information.
Also notice that any configuration is by itself converging, even
when oscillating (Qλ still tends to 0). It is the association of a
regular and an oscillating configuration that implies divergence
of vλ .
A way to forbid oscillations seems to consider semi-algebraic
games or more generally games definable in some o-minimal
structures (Bolte, Gaubert, Vigeral, 2013).
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